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Introduction to the Organizational Economics
of Inter-organizational Systems
JoongHo Ahn, College of Business Administration, Seoul National University, jahn@snu.ac.kr
SangJo Oh, Department of MIS, Dongyang Technical College, secase@dongyang.ac.kr
Abstract
This paper describes the current research approaches
and directions on the organizational economics of interorganizational systems, and suggests an alternative
perspective to the conventional approach, transaction cost
economics. This paper concludes with suggestions on
incorporating other theories to the organizational
economics researches.

Introduction
Information technology, especially Internet, has been
changing the way firms do business. Information
technology enabling easy and cheap connections between
firms blurs the boundaries of the firm, and thus making
firms cooperate and compete in an unprecedented way.
Firms could enjoy the producing efficiencies of the markets
and the operating efficiencies of the hierarchies at the same
time.
Inter-organizational system is defined as “information
and communication technology-based systems that
transcend legal enterprise boundaries” (Bakos, 1991) and as
yet, the studies on the organizational economics of interorganizational systems were performed mainly from the
viewpoint of transaction cost economics (Malone, Yates,
and Benjamin, 1987; Clemons, Reddi, and Row, 1993;
Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991; Hess and Kemerer, 1994;
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1994). Transaction cost
economics provides a firm ground to investigate various
aspects of inter-organizational relationship with welldefined constructs although it has some limitations caused
from its rationality assumptions and market failure
approach. However, to investigate into the organizational
economics of inter-organizational systems all the relevant
theories and propositions need to be integrated so as to
come up with a comprehensive view.
We briefly review the transaction cost economics
approach and suggest an alternative approach to
organizational economics of inter-organizational systems.
Then suggestions on incorporating other relevant theories
follow.

Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction cost economics is a comparative
institutional approach to economic organization, in which
technology is de-emphasized in favor of organization, and
the economizing action resides in the details of transactions
and the mechanisms of governance. That is a predictive
theory of economic organization in which a large number
of apparently dissimilar phenomena are shown to be
variations on a few key transaction cost economizing
themes (Williamson, 1996).

In his article, Coase views the firm as a governance
structure, and market as an alterative means to conduct
similar transactions (Coase, 1937), which is the beginning
of the transaction cost economics. Williamson has made
considerable contributions to transaction cost economics by
identifying types of exchanges that are more appropriately
conducted within firm boundaries than within the market
and by augmenting Coase’s initial framework (Williamson,
1975, 1985, 1996).
Williamson’s framework is based on assumptions of
human behavior (bounded rationality, opportunism) and
dimensions of transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty).
Bounded rationality is the assumption that decision
makers have constraints on their cognitive capabilities and
limits on their rationality. Although decision makers intend
to act rationally this intention may be circumscribed by
their limited information processing and communication
ability (Simon, 1957). Williamson defines opportunism as
“self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975). It is
the assumption that, given the opportunity, decision makers
may seek to serve self-interests.
Asset specificity refers to the transferability of the
assets that support a given transaction (Williamson, 1985).
Assets with high amount of specificity represent sunk cost
that has little value outside of a particular exchange
relationship. Uncertainty means not-known and/or notdetermined condition and classified into environmental and
behavioral uncertainties. Environmental uncertainty raises
an adaptation problem, which is difficulty with modifying
agreements to changing circumstances. The effect of
behavioral uncertainty is a performance evaluation problem,
which is difficulty with verifying whether compliance with
established agreements has occurred (Rindfleisch and
Heide, 1997).
The basic premise of transaction cost economics is that
if transaction cost is low or absent – that is cost incurred
from adaptation, performance evaluation, and safeguarding
cost – economic actors would favor market governance
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). If transaction cost is too
high then, economic actors would resort to hierarchy
governance. The implicit assumption behind this basic
premise is that hierarchy has more operating efficiencies
than market and market has more producing efficiencies
than hierarchy.
Transaction cost economics has been widely applied to
many inter-organizational information systems researches.
Because of its nature transaction cost economics is used
mostly to exploratory studies that predict the future of
inter-firm relationship. Previous exploratory predictive
researches focus on the changes of transaction cost with
inter-organizational systems, eventual changes of interorganizational relationship, and performance impact of the
change of governance mode.
Below are some of the researches accomplished in the
transaction cost economics framework.
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Application of Transaction Cost Economics to
Inter-organizational Systems

Alternative Approaches
It is also important to incorporate relevant theories into
the inter-organizational systems research. Transaction cost
economics is just one of the theories modeling interorganizational economics. Below are some of the theories
applicable to organizational economics of interorganizational systems research. Each theory views interorganizational relationships from different perspective, and
provides a firm ground to study organizational economics
of inter-organizational systems. All the relevant theories
should be incorporated into the study of interorganizational systems for comprehensive understanding of
organizational economics of inter-organizational systems.

Malone, Yates, and Benjamin predicted market-like
arrangement would prevail because electronic brokerage
effect would exceed electronic integration effect (Malone,
Yates, and Benjamin, 1987). Several researchers tried to
predict the changes of inter-organizational relationship
differently after this hypothesis was formulated.
Bakos and Brynjolfsson included non-contractible
investments in their economic model and argued that
market-like inter-organizational relationship would not be
effective considering incentive implication of the noncontractible investments (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1997).
Clemons, Reddi, and Row argued the move to the middle
hypothesis (Clemons, Reddi, and Row, 1993). Their idea
was that electronic commerce would not only reduce
transaction cost but also transaction risk. Increasing market
transactions due to the reduction of transaction cost means
more outsourcing and also more transaction risk, and thus
the relationship will move to the middle. Gurbaxani and
Whang incorporating agency theory and transaction cost
economics predicts the size of the firm (Gurbaxani and
Whang, 1991).
Hess and Kemerer examined the electronic market
hypothesis using finance industry subject in a proprietary
system environment and failed to verify the electronic
market hypothesis (Hess and Kemerer, 1994). Zaheer and
Venkatraman tried to empirically find the determinants of
electronic integration and found asset specificity, trust and
size of the firm influenced the electronic integration
(Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1994).

Network Perspective
As an alternative approach to the mode of governance,
network perspective could give valuable insights to the
inter-organizational systems research. In his article, Powell
pointed out the limitations of transaction cost approach.
It fails to capture the complex realities of exchange. The
continuum view also misconstrues patterns of economic
development and blinds us to the role played by reciprocity
and collaboration as alternative governance mechanisms.
By sticking to the twin pillars of markets and hierarchies,
our attention is deflected from a diversity of organizational
designs that are neither fish nor fowl, nor some mongrel
hybrid, but a distinctly different from them (Powell, 1990).
Table 1. summarizes some of the key differences among
markets, hierarchies, and networks.
Table 1. Stylized Comparison of Forms of Economic
Organization (1990, Powell)

Limitations of Previous Research Based on
Transaction Cost Economics
Until now, the empirical researches are rare and
exploratory, theoretical, predictive studies are the usual
case. That is because of the predictive nature of transaction
cost economics and measurement problems of its constructs.
It is not easy to develop instruments to measure such
constructs as opportunism and asset specificity, and if good
instruments are developed and validated, it is often limited
and only applicable to the specific research context.
Information technology provides the opportunities that
firms could reduce transaction costs when they interact
with partner firms, and also internal transaction cost when
they operate. Previous researches applied transaction cost
constructs to the electronically connected environment, and
the focus lied on the effects of changes of transaction cost
structure on the change of governance mode. However,
inter-organizational systems research should also
investigate into the ex-post problems such as development
of efficient control mechanisms.
To investigate into the adoption and use of interorganizational systems and eventual changes in the interorganizational relationship, all the relevant theories should
be integrated and provide a comprehensive view. Recent
development and application of information technologies
write different stories from the previous researches. Many
virtual organizations, electronic business communities
appear and disappear just for one day. The comprehensive
researches on the organizational economics of interorganizational systems should be provided to explain the
present status and to predict the future development.

Key Features
Normative Basis

Means of
Communication
Methods of
Conflict
Resolution
Degree of
Flexibility
Amount of
Commitment
Tone or
Climate
Actor
Preference
or Choices

Forms
Market
Contract
Property
Rights
Prices

Hierarchy
Employment
Relationship

Network
Complementary
Strength

Routines

Relational

Haggling

Administrative
fiat

Norm of
Reciprocity

High

Low

Medium

Low

Medium to
High
Formal,
Bureaucratic
Dependent

Medium to High

Precision,
suspicion
Independent

Open-ended
Reciprocity
Interdependent

Network perspective could be an alternative approach
to view the inter-organizational relationships and could be a
useful framework to investigate into inter-organizational
information systems.

Resource Dependence
Resource dependence theory views inter-firm
governance as a strategic response to conditions of
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uncertainty and dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Few organizations are internally self-sufficient with respect
to critical resources, and in this sense problems are
dependence on the parties who obtained focal resources,
and difficulties of decision-making based on accurate
prediction caused by out of full resource control.
The main premise of resource dependence theory is that
firms will seek to reduce uncertainty and manage
dependence by purposely structuring their exchange
relationships by means of establishing formal or
semiformal links with other firms (Ulrich and Barney,
1984).
Resource dependence perspective could be an
alternative approach to view the inter-organizational
relationships and could be easily incorporated into the
inter-organizational systems researches.

Others
Trust and commitment are important constructs
explaining inter-firm relationships and trust is proved to
have relations with relationship commitment. Trust is a
multi-faceted construct. Rational perspective of trust
centers on the calculus of self-interest and the social
perspective of trust centers around moral duty. Rational
perspective of trust is the obverse of opportunism, and it
has been used several times in the inter-organizational
systems researches that are mainly based on transaction
cost economics. Transaction cost economics assumes
bounded rationality, and social perspective of trust was
naturally excluded from the researches. Power is also an
important construct to explain inter-firm relationship.
Power/Dependence model would be useful to explain
adoption and use of inter-organizational systems.
Dependence is a function of the proportion of the
dependent organization’s need for resources or services that
the other organization can provide, and the inverse
proportion of the ability of any other organization to
provide the same resources or services (Emerson, 1962).
The more dependent a firm is to the partner, the greater the
partner’s power to influence a firm’s decision making.
So far, inter-organizational systems research focus on
the rational aspects of inter-organizational relationships and
it should incorporate the social aspect of the relationships.

Conclusion
We have shown the current status of the organizational
economics research of inter-organizational systems.
Previous researches in this field usually applied transaction
cost economics to investigate the various aspects of interorganizational systems. We pointed out some of the
limitations of transaction cost approach to this area. Also
we suggested some good relevant theories to incorporate
for comprehensive understanding of the interorganizational economics of inter-organizational
information systems.
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